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Background 
 
Recent nondestructive evaluation efforts within NASA have focused on an 
inspection system for the detection of intergranular cracking originating in the relief radius 
of Primary Reaction Control System (PCRS) Thrusters [1-3]. Of particular concern is deep 
cracking in this area which could lead to combustion leakage in the event of through wall 
cracking from the relief radius into an acoustic cavity of the combustion chamber.    In 
order to reliably detect such defects while ensuring minimal false positives during 
inspection, the Orthogonal Probe Eddy Current (OPEC) system has been developed.  The 
technique incorporates a dual frequency, orthogonally wound eddy current probe mounted 
on a stepper motor controlled scanning system.  The system is designed to inspect for outer 
surface damage from the interior of the thruster. As the outer surface of the thruster is 
inaccessible without extensive disassembly, this enables on vehicle or routine depot level 
inspection of thrusters for relief radius intergranular cracking.  A more detailed description 
of the OPEC technique is contained in a previous report [1]. 
 
 
System Validation 
 
In order to verify the reliability of the OPEC system an extensive validation 
including blind inspection of over 1500 acoustic cavities was performed.  Validation testing 
was conducted at United Space Alliance (USA) facilities in Cape Canaveral Air Force 
Station by USA eddy current level II NDE inspectors.  Prior to the beginning of the 
inspections, two days of training consisting of a system overview, demonstration, and 
hands on practice was provided to the inspectors by the system developer.  Demonstration 
and hands on work was performed on a sample set consisting of an oil-bronze thruster 
replica with fabricated flaws as well acoustic cavities 25 – 29 of PRCS thruster serial 
number 713.  Following training, three United Space Alliance (USA) eddy current level II 
NDE inspectors were tasked to inspect the validation sample set.  These inspections were 
performed in accordance with written procedures documented in the validation plan [4,5].   
Flaw calls were made immediately by the inspectors and documented on inspection reports.  
All raw data were also saved for further analysis. 
 
Validation Sample Set 
 
Four PRCS thrusters, three of which contained fabricated electric discharge 
machine (EDM) notches, were used for this validation study.  Table 1 reports the location, 
remaining wall thickness, and angle of the flaw with respect to mounting flange for each of 
the fabricated EDM notches.  The first 11 notches were placed directly across from the 
indicated acoustic cavity while the final 7 notches were placed between the two adjacent 
cavities identified in the table.  The resulting flaw population contains 18 independent 
flaws approaching 25 acoustic cavities.  The fourth thruster used in the validation study 
contained no flaws.  As each thruster contains 42 acoustic cavities, the sample set of four 
thrusters contained 143 unflawed inspection sites.  The complete validation sample set was 
inspected three times by each of the three level II NDE inspectors for a total of nine 
1
inspection cycles.  The complete validation inspections therefore resulting in 225 scans of 
cavities with approaching flaws and 1287 scans of unflawed cavities.  Neglecting the 5 
inspection sites used for training and calibration, the condition of the thrusters was not 
known to the inspectors. 
   
 
 
Table 1.  Manufactured Flaws in Validation Standards 
Thruster 
S/N 
Acoustic 
Cavity 
Remaining Wall 
Thickness (in) 
Flaw Angle 
(degrees) 
714 16 0.02 30 
451 27 0.02 45 
713 37 0.02 60 
451 32 0.04 30 
714 32 0.04 45 
451 37 0.04 60 
714 27 0.02 45 
714 37 0.06 45 
713 27 0.03 45 
713 32 0.06 45 
713 16 0.04 45 
    
714 10/11 0.02 30 
451 42/1 0.02 45 
713 42/1 0.02 60 
713 5/6 0.04 30 
714 5/6 0.04 45 
713 10/11 0.04 60 
451 5/6 0.06 45 
  
 
 Inspection Results 
 
 Flaw calls were reported by the inspectors immediately following the scan of a 
given cavity.  This call data along with specific inspection criteria and all raw data were 
then recorded before the next cavity was inspected. Figure 1 displays a plot of the flaw call 
results.  In this plot the hit ratio for flaws at each remaining wall thickness is calculated as 
the number of flaw calls divided by the number of opportunities to detect flaws of that 
remaining wall thickness.  All unflawed cavities are plotted at a thickness of 0.145”, the 
approximate minimum wall thickness between the relief radius and acoustic cavity in the 
absence of any flaws.  All inspections at sites with 0.020” and 0.030” remaining wall 
thicknesses were called along with 89/90 0.040” remaining wall thickness sites and 18/36 
0.060” flaw sites.  No false positives were reported from any of the unflawed cavities. 
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A closer look at the data reveals additional information concerning the undetected 
flaws. Strong evidence exists that the one missed call at 0.040” remaining wall thickness is 
due to a missed inspection site rather than a missed call at the site with 0.040” remaining 
wall thickness.  It appears a duplicate inspection was performed on the cavity prior to the 
cavity in question (S/N 713, AC16) which was then skipped over on the next inspection.  
All other inspections of S/N 713 AC 16 produced strong flaw response.  The remaining 
missed calls all occurred at the sites corresponding to the 0.060” remaining wall thickness 
flaw originating between adjacent acoustic cavities (S/N451 AC5-AC6).   The two flaws 
with 0.060” remaining wall thickness which originate directly across from the acoustic 
cavity (S/N 713, AC32 and S/N 714 AC37) were detected in every inspection cycle. 
Another method for examining the validation test results is to plot the system 
response versus remaining wall thickness.  The data fall into two main clusters depending 
upon the orientation of the flaws.  Figure 2 displays the results for all flaws originating 
across from an acoustic cavity.  The plot contains the results from all nine inspection 
cycles.  The indication level for all unflawed cavities is shown as the cluster of points at 
0.145” remaining wall thickness.  The single missed inspection at S/N713 acoustic cavity 
16 (0.040” remaining wall thickness) is clearly out of family with the remainder of the data 
and, as discussed above, is the result of a missed inspection of that site.  Otherwise the data 
show a strong correlation between indication strength and remaining wall thickness with a 
clear distinction between all flawed and unflawed cavities.  An indication strength of 0.5 
volts was set by procedure to be the threshold for a relevant flaw indication [3]. 
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Figure 1.  Hit ratio for flaws at all 1512 cavities inspected during validation testing. 
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Figure 3 displays the results for all flaws originating directly between acoustic 
cavities.  As in figure 2, the plot contains the results from all nine inspection cycles.  A 
drop in the indication level as compared to flaws originating across from the cavities is 
evident.  The indication level for between cavity flaws at 0.060” remaining wall thickness 
overlaps the distribution for the unflawed cavities.  All flaws within 0.040” of the cavity 
are clearly separated from the unflawed cavities and were detected in the study. 
Another factor which was found to influence the measured indication strength is the 
angle of the flaw with respect to the thruster mounting flange.  As reported earlier, flaws 
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Figure 2.  Indication strength for all notches originating across from an acoustic cavity. 
All Notches Between  Cavities
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14
Remaining Wall Thickness
In
di
ca
tio
n
 
St
re
n
gt
h
SN413
SN713
SN714
SN451
Figure 3.  Indication strength for all notches originating between adjacent acoustic 
cavities. 
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were introduced at angles of 30, 45 and 60 degrees.  While the 30 and 45 degree flaws 
showed a similar response to the inspection system, edge effects associated with the 
proximity of the 60 degree flaw tip to the thruster face resulted in slightly reduced detection 
sensitivity.  It should be noted that such high angle flaws appear to be rare.  Destructive 
analysis performed by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center on PRCS Thruster S/N 
132 found flaw angles to be typically between 40 and 50 degrees with a maximum 
measured flaw angle of 54 degrees [6].   
In figures 4 the 60 degree flaws have been removed to show the strong correlation 
between remaining wall thickness and indication strength for the 30 and 45 degree flaws 
originating across from an acoustic cavity.  The missed inspection at S/N 713 AC 16 has 
also been removed for clarity.  Figure 5 shows the equivalent data for flaws originating 
between adjacent acoustic cavities. Here the plotted indication strength is the average of the 
recorded signal from the acoustic cavities on either side of the flaw.  Averaging these 
values helps to correct for potential misplacement of the flaw between the cavities. 
 
Relationship Between Validation Artifacts and PRCS Thruster Cracking 
 
The applicability of electric discharge machine notches to simulate naturally occurring 
cracking in PRCS thrusters for the development of nondestructive evaluation standards has 
to be taken into account to predict the detectable size of such damage.  To this end a limited 
number of intergranular cracking sites previously identified in PRCS thruster S/N 132 have 
been maintained for NDE development and system calibration.   As realistic flaws are 
difficult to fabricate, especially in statistically relevant quantities for NDE system 
validation, validations are typically performed with fabricated notches.  A (knockdown) 
factor describing the response of the system between the validation artifacts and actual 
flaws is then sought to bound the flaw detectability on real hardware.   
 
  
30 and 45 Degree Notches Across From Cavities
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 Figure 4.  Indication strength for 30 and 45 degree notches originating across from an 
acoustic cavity. 
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 In this work the eight remaining inspection sites on PRCS Thruster S/N 132 were 
examined with the OPEC system.  As describe in the NESC Report [6], sections of this 
thruster have been destructively examined and crack depths measured.  Figure 6 displays 
the indication levels from this naturally occurring damage along with measured crack 
depths.  The data acquired from acoustic cavities 37 and 38 each showed saturation in the 
low frequency (12 kHz) response along with a very strong vertical response in the high 
frequency (100 kHz) data.  As the standard depth of penetration of the electromagnetic 
field in the thruster is approximately 0.070” at 12 kHz but only approximately 0.025” at 
100 kHz, this indicates that the discontinuity in the material extends very close to the 
acoustic cavity wall and is potentially a through wall flaw in these locations.  
By extrapolating the measured crack depths from the destructive analysis of S/N 
132 through an area with a preseved acoustic cavity an approximation of the remaining 
wall thickness at the OPEC inspeciton site can be determined.  Figure 7 plots the 
extrapolated remaing wall thickness in thruster S/N 132 versus indication strength for the 
OPEC system inspections.  The responses from acoustic cavities 37 and 38 have been 
removed from the plot due to system saturation at these inspection sites. Figure 7 also 
contains the data for the 30 and 45 degree notches placed across from an acoustic cavity.  
The data show that the signal level from naturally occurring damage is comparable to, or 
even higher, than that for the validation notches.  A likely cause for the increased signal 
levels on naturally occurring damage is the flaw profile.  All naturally occurring damage 
identified to date has shown a very high aspect ratio of crack length to crack depth.  The 
notch standards were all fabricated with a two to one aspect ratio, and therefore likely 
underestimate the crack length at a given remaining wall thickness.  The likely flaw aspect 
ratio also minimizes the potential for deep cracking between acoustic cavities without 
appreciable damage directly in front of a single cavity.   
 
 
 
30 and 45 Degree Notches Between  Cavities
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Figure 5.  Inspection Results for 30 and 45 degree notches originating between adjacent 
acoustic cavities.  Indication strength calculated from average of cavities on either side of 
notch. 
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SN132 Intergranular Cracking 
Plotted with 30 and 45 Degree Notches Across From Cavities
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Figure 7.  Plot of indication strength versus interpolated remaining wall thickness for 
naturally occurring interganular cracking in comparison to 30 and 45 degree notches 
placed across from an acoustic cavity. 
Figure 6.  Inspection results for intergranular cracking in PRCS thruster S/N 132.  Plot 
contains OPEC inspection results along with destructive analysis of thruster. 
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Summary 
  
An extensive validation of the orthogonal probe eddy current system for the 
detection of intergranular cracking in the relief radius of primary reaction control system 
thrusters has been performed.  All flaws in the validation study with 0.040” remaining wall 
thickness or less were detected and no false calls were reported.  In addition to remaining 
wall thickness, two other factors influencing the detectability of damage in PRCS thrusters 
have been identified as the location of the flaw (either across from or between acoustic 
cavities) and the angle of the flaw with respect to the acoustic cavity wall.  A comparison 
with naturally occurring damage indicates that the most likely flaw profile produces the 
strongest OPEC response, comparable to the response from validation notches placed in 
front of an acoustic cavity at angles between 30 and 45 degrees.  At this flaw orientation 
flaws with as much as 0.060” remaining wall thickness can be clearly separated from 
unflawed cavities.   
The results reported here show the OPEC system to be a robust, operator 
independent (with sufficient training), and reliable inspection method for intergranular 
crack detection in the relief radius of PRCS thruster components.  Deployment of the 
system for depot level inspections at NASA WSTF will provide valuable information and 
can be implemented with minimal impact on thruster processing. 
   
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 This work was conducted as part of an integrated team of participants from NASA-
JSC, NASA-WSTF, NASA-LaRC, NASA Engineering and Safety Center, United Space 
Alliance, and Boeing formed to address NDE requirements for orbiter PRCS thruster 
inspections. 
           
References 
 
1. B.A. Wincheski, J.W. Simpson, and A. Koshti, “Development of Eddy Current 
Techniques for the Detection of Cracking In Space Shuttle Primary Reacion Control 
Thrusters,” NASA/TP-2007-214878, 2007. 
2. R. Saulsberry et. al, “NASAEngineering and Safety Center Nondestructive Evaluaiton 
Technical Review of the Space Shuttle Primary Reaction Control Thruster Injector 
Crack Issue,”  NASA Engineering and Safety Center White Paper, 2005. 
3. J.E. Engel, R.G. Young, and J.B. Hulupnik, “Nondestructive Evaluation Methods for 
Orbiter Reaction Control System Thrusters,” Boeing Huntington Beach Lab Report No. 
M&P-3-1696, 2006. 
4. L. Going, “Procedure for Orthogonal Probe Eddy Current Inspection of PRCS 
Thrusters,” Procedure No. CLG-EC1-001, United Space Alliance, 2006. 
5. L. Going, “Validation Plan for Othogonal Probe Eddy Current Inspection of PRCS 
Thruster,” United Space Alliance, 2006. 
6. R.A. Mackay, S.W. Smith, S.R. Shah, and R.S. Piasick, “Reaction Control System 
Thrusters Cracking Consultaion:NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) 
Materials Super Problem Resolution Team (SPRT) Findings,” NASA/TP-2005-214053, 
2006. 
8
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
2.  REPORT TYPE 
Technical Memorandum
 4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Validation Test Results for Orthogonal Probe Eddy Current Thruster 
Inspection System
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
 6.  AUTHOR(S)
Wincheski, Russell (Buzz) A.
 7.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA  23681-2199
 9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC  20546-0001
 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
     REPORT NUMBER
L-19426
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
NASA
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
An electronic version can be found at http://ntrs.nasa.gov
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unclassified - Unlimited
Subject Category 26
Availability:  NASA CASI (301) 621-0390         
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
STI Help Desk (email:  help@sti.nasa.gov)
14. ABSTRACT
Recent nondestructive evaluation efforts within NASA have focused on an inspection system for the detection of intergranular 
cracking originating in the relief radius of Primary Reaction Control System (PCRS) Thrusters. Of particular concern is deep 
cracking in this area which could lead to combustion leakage in the event of through wall cracking from the relief radius into 
an acoustic cavity of the combustion chamber. In order to reliably detect such defects while ensuring minimal false positives 
during inspection, the Orthogonal Probe Eddy Current (OPEC) system has been developed and an extensive validation study 
performed. This report descirbes the validation procedure, sample set, and inspection results as well as comparing validation 
flaws with the response from naturally occuring damage.  
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Eddy Current; Intergranular Cracking; Thruster; Validation
18. NUMBER
      OF 
      PAGES
13
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
(301) 621-0390
a.  REPORT
U
c. THIS PAGE
U
b. ABSTRACT
U
17. LIMITATION OF 
      ABSTRACT
UU
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
3.  DATES COVERED (From - To)
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
377816.06.02.03.05
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT
      NUMBER(S)
NASA/TM-2007-215087
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person 
shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1.  REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
11 - 200701-
